INTRODUCTION
Learning from near-misses 144 Traditionally, financial trading is a domain in which incident data has not been collected, 145 analysed, or learnt from. In other high-risk industries, this is central to identifying risks to 146 organisational safety, and prioritising and designing changes for avoiding further mishaps 147 (Phimister et al., 2003) . Near misses in particular are useful for learning due to their frequent 148 occurrence, and information on how events were/can be avoided in future (Barach & Small, 149 2000; Reason, 2008) .
151
In order to identify the general characteristics of successful systems that collect and interpret 152 near miss data, and to identify areas in which the field might develop, we consider a number 153 of key research studies reporting on incident monitoring systems. Although the review is 154 non-exhaustive, Table 1 lists six of the more commonly reported on incident-monitoring 155 systems. Near miss occurred in 96% of the selected errors (e.g. 1,000 cases of near miss, 42 cases of 293 failure). Of the 1,000 near miss incidents, the lead author coded all the cases; 250 (25%) were 294 coded by a human factors expert in order to provide a reliability assessment for coding.
295
For the purpose of this study, the author only considered near miss incidents that were 296 reported as the aim of the analysis is to uncover how the incidents are caught or detected 297 within the organisation. 
ANALYSIS

320
The results section reports on the following three analyses. error (e.g. 'fat fingers') and which skills are most commonly drawn upon to capture error 335 (e.g. attention).
337
Third we undertook an analysis of the skills and systems used to detect and prevent error and 338 the causes of error together, the purpose of which is to illustrate how the skills that cause within the company, and due to the data being generated through staff self-reporting, is likely 353 to be an underestimation.
Reliability Analysis
We examined the reliability of coding between the author and a human factors expert. to classify the causes of error and the skills that led to the detection of error. 
391
394
In terms of using FINANS to better understand the human factors that support the detection 395 of error in the trading domain, Table 3 shows that all near miss were coded with a human 396 factors category, with over half the near miss being caused by slip/lapse (52%) and 397 ameliorated by teamwork (65%). The sections below provide a granular description of the 398 skills that cause error and the skills that help trading staff capture error (e.g. near miss 399 incident).
401
Causes of error. was decision making (1%).
In absolute terms, the most commonly coded element was fat fingers (343), followed by 407 procedural (126) and maintenance and testing of systems (123). As seen in previous studies 408 using FINANS, some elements were rarely coded; interpreting information (7), cue 409 recognition (3), and bias and heuristics (9); however, unlike previous studies, each element 410 was coded at least once in the data coding process.
412
Skills and systems that led to the detection and prevention of error. Table 3 indicates that 413 overwhelmingly the error is detected and prevented by teamwork skills (65%) followed
414
closely by situation awareness (46%). Human computer interface skills were identified in
415
15% of the near miss. The least coded category was slip/lapse (0.2%), followed by decision-416 making (1.4%) and leadership (2%).
417
In terms of elements, the most commonly coded was role and responsibilities (340), gathering To illustrate the context of the data collection (and the potential for intervention), and the 427 types of problems and skills being identified using FINANS, Table 4 provides a sample of 428 characteristic codified examples. The association analysis preformed in this study shows that slip/lapse and human computer activities to avoid the escalation of errors into harm (Manser, 2009 FINANS taxonomy, and it may require further development to tailor it to near miss data.
636
Issues such as stress, fatigue, and environmental factors (e.g. culture) were not examined and 637 this could be the focus of future work. Moreover, the human factors research within this 638 study refers to non-technical skills as 'skills' and in order to keep consistency refers to the 639 additional set of human factors codes (e.g. slip/lapse, human computer interface) as 'skills' as 640 well. Therefore the terminology around this may be somewhat confused (error within the 641 non-technical skills literature is often observed as a problem in skill application).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the current study, we examined a cohort of near miss incidents collected from a financial 
